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The phantom of Palais Brongniart:
economic patriotism and the Paris
Stock Exchange
Helen Callaghan and Paul Lagneau-Ymonet
ABSTRACT France is famous for promoting national champions, notably by pre-
venting foreign takeovers, but in 2005–2006, the French government allowed the
New York Stock Exchange to take control of Euronext, a French-led pan-European
company that includes the Paris Bourse. By mapping the public discourse surround-
ing this striking case of non-intervention, we explain why opponents of the transat-
lantic merger failed in their appeals to ‘economic patriotism’. Discursive strategies
designed to justify discrimination against territorially defined outsiders ran into
several hurdles, including weak patriotic sentiments for the company concerned; a
lack of patriotic alternatives to the proposed merger; and the questionable patriotic
credentials of those demanding intervention. Our findings advance research on
demand side of ‘economic patriotism’, including its discursive dimension. Beyond
that, they inform research on business–government relations, and on the political
implications of corporate ownership structures.
KEY WORDS Demutualization; discourse; Euronext; France; NYSE; ownership
structure.
1. INTRODUCTION
The Paris Stock Exchange – located, until the 1990s, at Palais Brongniart in the
Opera district of the French capital – has over the past three decades changed in
ways that seem difficult to reconcile with the dirigiste image of French govern-
ments. In 2006, after successive cross-border mergers, this former symbol of
national economic sovereignty became a subsidiary of the New York Stock
Exchange (NYSE). Four years later, Euronext Paris and other continental Euro-
pean members of the now American-run group experienced significant downsiz-
ing and the relocation to London of crucial IT infrastructures and activities.1 At
the time of writing, in March 2011, NYSE-Euronext is confronted with com-
peting takeover offers from Deutsche Bo¨rse and Nasdaq/ICE. If either of
these deals goes through, Paris will suffer a further loss of influence.
The relative weakness of political efforts to prevent the Paris stock exchange
from falling into foreign hands is surprising, for several reasons. The cross-
border merger took place in a country with a long-standing record of transatlan-
tic defiance and of political intervention in the market for corporate control; it
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coincided with heavy-handed attempts to prevent cross-border mergers in other
sectors of the French economy; it concerned a sector that is arguably of high
economic and political significance and with regard to which the French govern-
ment has formal legal instruments of intervention at its disposal. Why did the
same government that took legislative action to prevent a rumoured takeover of
Danone by PepsiCo allow NYSE to gain control of Euronext?
By mapping the public discourse surrounding this striking case of non-interven-
tion, we explain why opponents of the transatlantic merger failed in their appeals to
‘economic patriotism’. Discursive strategies designed to justify political discrimi-
nation against territorially defined outsiders ran into several hurdles. Patriotic senti-
ments were difficult to mobilize for a company as perceivedly ‘Anglo-Saxon’ as
Euronext; the patriotic credentials of key opponents to the merger were weak,
because many of them had prepared the ground by profitably selling their shares
abroad; and instead of a patriotic alternative, ‘imperialist’ advances by Deutsche
Bo¨rse were seen as a likely outcome of failure to merge with NYSE.
Our contribution advances research on economic patriotism by helping to
explain when governments choose to discriminate in favour of territorially
defined insiders. While the heuristic provided by Clift and Woll (2012) usefully
distinguishes different levels (supranational, national, local), ideological affi-
nities (liberal or conservative) and policy objectives (favouring insiders or resist-
ance to outsiders) of economic patriotism, it does not offer clear predictions as
to when politicians choose to privilege territorially defined groups. The other
case studies assembled in this collection do not provide sufficient leverage on
this question, because they focus on instances of economic patriotism in a
variety of different contexts, while neglecting cases in which political action
was conspicuously absent.
We maintain that understanding variation in the supply of territorially based
discrimination requires looking beyond state action to the demand side of econ-
omic patriotism, including its discursive dimension. As Pepper Culpepper
(2011) has recently shown, economic policy-making is significantly shaped by
the amount of media attention devoted to the issue in question. Put bluntly,
‘business power goes down as political salience goes up’ (Culpepper 2011:
177), because business groups have tools and resources that allow them to dom-
inate fights in low-salience domains. However, ‘quiet politics’ is difficult to
engineer. Given the distributional consequences of economic policy-making,
there are always some people, both within and outside the business community,
who have an interest in raising the salience level in order to rally the broader
public behind their cause. Broad mobilization requires framing demands in
terms of some widely shared ‘public interest’. Appeals to patriotic sentiments
are frequently employed, presumably because such sentiments are widespread
and easily tapped without need for complex technical argumentation. Economic
patriotism, in other words, is a discursive strategy as much as an objective
concept.
By identifying limitations to this discursive strategy, our case study contrib-
utes to explaining why governments sometimes refrain from pursuing the
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kind of state action classified by Clift and Woll (2012). Whereas their approach
is implicitly based on a narrow policy-maker focused rationality (‘Will this
policy win me electoral support’), we argue that policy-making, especially econ-
omic policy, is a broader path-generation process (Djelic and Quack 2007)
which is shaped over time by a plurality of demands coming from stakeholders
and constituents. We share the assumption that vote-seeking politicians need to
act on high profile issues. However, we go one step further by noting that the
salience level of any given policy measure is discursively engineered. Our con-
tribution lies in identifying factors that determine whether those interested in
political intervention succeed in raising the salience of the issue by framing it
as a matter of economic patriotism. As a single case study of a ‘dog that did
not bark’, our contribution cannot pretend to engage in rigorous hypothesis-
testing. Nevertheless, it offers a first cut at filling a research gap recently ident-
ified by Vivien Schmidt, namely to move beyond asserting that discourse
matters, by exploring empirically when, where and why it matters– and
when it does not (cf. Schmidt 2010: 21).
Our empirical evidence derives from newspapers, interviews and participant
observation. Eighty volumes of newspaper articles compiled by Euronext Paris
between 2000 and 2007 served as our main source of press coverage. Twelve
interviews held between 2006 and 2010 with prominent figures of the Paris
financial centre (see Appendix) provided background information. Beyond
that, one of the authors had the opportunity to witness the in-house dynamics
of Euronext at first hand, through his position as an assistant to the Euronext
director of international affairs in Paris from October 2001 until August
2002, and as an assistant to the Euronext director of European affairs in Brussels
from August to November 2003.
We will proceed as follows. Section 2 justifies the case selection. Section 3
maps the preferences and discursive strategies of key French stakeholders con-
cerning political intervention in the NYSE/Euronext merger. We conclude
with suggestions for further research.
2. THE SURPRISING ABSENCE OF TERRITORIALLY BASED
DISCRIMINATION
Our study supplements the other contributions to this collection by examining a
case in which political action was conspicuously absent. The merger of Euronext
with NYSE lends itself well because, a priori, there were strong reasons to expect
political intervention. First, research on the geography of financial markets
suggests that the location of stock markets has economic, regulatory and politi-
cal implications. Economically, spatial proximity of issuers, investment banks,
financial analysts, the stock exchange(s), asset managers and investors enhances
the exchange of both formal and informal information and offers valuable
network externalities. These benefits are said to explain why, contrary to predic-
tions that information technology would spell the ‘end of geography’ (O’Brien
1992), financial activities remain highly concentrated in a few financial centres
390 Journal of European Public Policy
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(Sassen 2005; Tadjeddine and Capelle-Blancard 2009). The same benefits are
also cited as a reason for the persistently strong so-called ‘home bias’ in invest-
ment decisions: investors tend to hold, trade and obtain superior returns from
securities issued by companies that are ‘familiar’ to them (Wo´jcik 2009). From a
supervisory point of view, stock market location matters because governments
and regulatory authorities have only limited influence outside their own juris-
diction. Stock market regulation affects the market for corporate control, cor-
porate governance, the protection of investors and financial regulation at
large. The transfer of regulatory power over these matters to foreign institutions
therefore implies a weakening of economic governance at the national level. Pol-
itically, nations throughout the history of capitalism have used the size and
might of their financial centres as resources in the contest for geopolitical leader-
ship (Cassis 2006; Ferguson 2001; Weber 2000 [1894]). Even the rapid expan-
sion, since the launch of the Euromarkets in the 1960s, of cross-border financial
transactions outside incumbent exchanges was originally promoted by the
United States (US) and the British governments to secure their financial supre-
macy at that time (Helleiner 1994).
Second, the weakness of political efforts to prevent foreign control of the
stock market coincided with a string of high-profile interventions against
attempted foreign takeovers of other French companies. Building on a long tra-
dition of dirigisme (Shonfield 1965; Zysman 1983), the French government
lived up to its reputation as the champion of national champions by intervening
in bids for the oil company Elf by its Italian rival ENI in 1999, for the pharma-
ceutical company Aventis by Switzerland’s Novartis in 2003 and by forestalling
suspected bids for Danone and for the Suez conglomerate in 2005–2006. In the
same year, the government also drafted a new decree granting itself a right to
veto or impose conditions on foreign takeovers of French firms in 11 sectors2
which it declared strategic and ordered the state-owned Caisse des De´pots et
Consignations to increase its investment in French equities.
Third, in contrast to the case of Danone, which triggered new legislation, a
legal basis for intervention was already available to policy-makers. The French
subsidiary of Euronext, which operates the Paris Stock Exchange, has a
hybrid legal status: it is not an ordinary private company but a specialized finan-
cial institution (institution financie`re spe´cialise´e). As such, Euronext Paris is gov-
erned by French banking legislation, including the French Banking Act as
amended and codified in the French Monetary and Financial Code. It is there-
fore subject to supervision by the Financial Markets Authority (Autorite´ des
Marche´s Financiers) and the Banking Commission – Commission Bancaire –
which became the Prudential Control Authority in March 2010. The French
administration can nominate a commissioner to the board of Euronext Paris
to ensure implementation of the ‘permanent public-interest mission’ entrusted
to the company by law.
Fourth, judging by their public objections to a transatlantic merger with
NYSE, influential French policy-makers at the supranational, national and
regional level were not indifferent to the fate of Euronext. At the European
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level, Jean-Claude Trichet, president of the European Central Bank and a
former French civil servant, warned that a transatlantic merger might weaken
EU monetary policy.3 Pervenche Be`res, French Socialist Member of the Euro-
pean Parliament (MEP), demanded that the European Commission intervene
to ‘protect the public interest’.4 At the national level, President Jacques
Chirac said that he preferred a merger with Deutsche Bo¨rse ‘for reasons of prin-
ciple.’5 Jean Arthuis, president of the Finance Commission in the French
Senate, and French head of the Deutsch-Franzo¨sische Freundschaftsgruppen der
Parlamente, demanded that ‘the [French] government, the German government
and other European governments pull themselves together and press for the cre-
ation of a pan-European stock exchange’.6 The Parti Socialiste let it be known
that it was ‘completely opposed to the merger.’7 Pierre Moscovici, international
affairs spokesman for the Socialist Party (Parti Socialiste, PS) and Jean-Pierre
Jouyet, Secretary of State for European Affairs at the time of the merger and
chairman of the Financial Markets Authority since December 2008, declared
ex post that they would have preferred a European solution.8 At the local
level, Jean-Paul Huchon, head of the Paris area regional assembly (Re´gion Ile
de France), regarded the transatlantic merger as a ‘bad signal’.9
Despite these widespread reservations, and in contrast to simultaneous inter-
vention in other cross-border mergers, French policy-makers chose not to use
the full repertoire of legal and political tools to prevent NYSE from acquiring
Euronext. Instead, both the French Financial Markets Authority and the
French government remained neutral on the ownership question: provided
that the operator of the exchange complied with the legal requirements and gov-
ernance amendments to assure formal equilibrium between European and
American members of its board, the capital structure of the exchange would
not matter. The French chief regulator, Michel Prada, and his peers from the
United Kingdom (UK), Belgium, the Netherlands and Portugal co-operated
with their counterparts from the US Securities Exchange Commission to
solve legal technicalities of the proposed merger. Thierry Breton, the French
finance minister, successfully pushed for a formally equal governance structure,
but he repeatedly insisted that, while customers and employees would be con-
sulted, the ultimate decision on the merger lay with shareholders.10
3. DEMAND FOR AND OPPOSITION TO GOVERNMENT
INTERVENTION
A look at the demand for government intervention in the NYSE/Euronext
merger shows French business e´lites highly mobilized and deeply divided on
the issue – possibly because the ownership composition of the stock exchange
and its strategy could affect a larger part of the corporate community than that
of companies in the industrial sector. While the main beneficiaries of interven-
tion against a foreign takeover of industrial companies (management and
employees of the companies concerned) usually have higher stakes than their
opponents (free-market ideologues and minority shareholders), the NYSE/
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Euronext merger pitched Euronext management against Euronext users (that is,
French issuers and financial intermediaries), all of whom had material interests
at stake.
Top managers of Euronext wanted the merger to go through. Accordingly,
they repeatedly insisted that theirs was a private company. As early as 2001,
Euronext Chief Eexecutive Officer (CEO) Jean-Franc¸ois Theodore presented
demutualized stock exchanges as ‘an industry like any other’ and warned
against ‘speak[ing] of alliances as if we are diplomats’.11 The same view was pro-
moted by influential French economists, including members of the prime min-
ister’s Council of Economic Advisors (Conseil d’analyse e´conomique). Some of
the most vocal economists in the debate, including Bertrand Jacquillat (pro-
fessor at Sciences Po Paris, chairman and CEO of the financial consultancy Ass-
ocie´s en Finance) and Christian Saint-Etienne (professor at the University of
Tours, lobbyist at Schell et Associe´s), were simultaneously members of the
Cercle des e´conomistes, a prominent French think tank, partially subsidized by
Euronext.12
By contrast, many issuers and financial intermediaries, including former
owners of the Paris Stock Exchange, opposed the transatlantic merger. Ge´rard
de La Martinie`re, head of the powerful French federation of insurance compa-
nies and spokesman for the Mouvement des Entreprises de France (MEDEF),
the French peak business federation, pleaded for ‘European connections that
would allow us to enlarge the capital pool while remaining in our own zone
of monetary activity’.13 The European Association of Listed Companies,
chaired by Alain Joly, CEO of the French blue chip Air Liquide, complained
that ‘[t]he proposed governance structure that puts NYSE in control, gives no
assurance in the long run as to the preservation of the interests of European
issuers’.14 Claude Be´be´ar, supervisory board president of AXA and a leading
figure of French capitalism, objected to demutualized stock exchanges per se
and wanted them to be kept under the control of their users, at least through
a shareholding pact. Michel Pe´bereau, supervisory board president of BNP
and arguably the most powerful banker in France (Jabko and Massoc 2011)
worried that a transatlantic move would dilute the influence of his bank more
severely than would consolidation at the continental European level. A high-
profile study of NYSE’s and Deutsche Bo¨rse’s takeover offers, commissioned
by Paris Europlace, a public–private association charged with promoting the
Paris financial centre, and conducted by Henri Lachmann, CEO of Schneider
Electric, concluded that ‘the transatlantic acquisition is not in the best interest
of the European market place’.15
Apart from lobbying behind the scenes, some of the business leaders opposing
the merger openly demanded state intervention. Ge´rard de La Martinie`re
wanted the French government to ‘bang its fist on the table’.16 Axel Miller,
CEO of the Franco-Belgian bank Dexia, complained after the merger that
‘the finance ministers should have taken care of this matter . . . The stock
exchange is a vital instrument for growth and employment, and for the
market economy at large. The failure to preserve it reveals the current political
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void.’17 Their policy preferences intriguingly resembled those of the Socialist
Party, which called on the government to ‘immediately take . . . responsible
action by opposing the merger in such a way that economic patriotism, be it
French or European, does not remain a mere slogan’.18 Interestingly, perhaps
for the reasons identified below, the Socialists refrained from repeating this
line of attack in the run-up to the presidential elections.
The following section explains why opponents of the transatlantic merger
failed to build up political pressure for intervention, despite a political
climate that – in the run-up to the 2007 presidential elections – was highly
receptive to appeals to economic patriotism.
4. THE DISCURSIVE LIMITATIONS OF ‘ECONOMIC
PATRIOTISM’
Several discursive hurdles prevented successful instrumentalization of the econ-
omic patriotism discourse by opponents of the merger. First, patriotic senti-
ments among the electorate were difficult to mobilize for a company as
foreign and removed from people’s lives as Euronext. Unlike consumer products
such as yoghurt and cars, financial services do not lend themselves well to the
kind of emotional attachment prone to stirring patriotic sentiments, especially
since they can be construed as elements of ‘Anglo-American style capitalism’,
even when the providers are French. In addition, the number of French jobs
at stake was small. In 2006, the Paris branch of Euronext – the largest within
the company – employed fewer than 400 people, mostly in positions that
failed to spark feelings of solidarity in the average French worker. Moreover,
direct and indirect shareholdings are still relatively scarce in France, where an
extended public welfare state provides retirement pensions through taxation,
contributions and intergenerational redistribution, rather than through individ-
ual capitalization and private savings (Montagne 2006).
Second, a convincing ‘patriotic’ alternative to the transatlantic merger was not
available. In other recent cases of government intervention, blockage of a cross-
border merger typically resulted either in the French company remaining inde-
pendent, or in a Franco-French alliance. In the case of Euronext, failure to
merge with NYSE was widely expected to result in a merger with Deutsche
Bo¨rse. Proponents of intervention tried to overcome this discursive hurdle by
appealing to ‘economic patriotism’ at the European level: Arthuis argued that
‘one year after the failure of the referendum on the [Lisbon] treaty . . . this
new project of allowing the pan-European stock exchange Euronext to fall
under the control of the New York Stock Exchange is a woeful sign and a con-
fession of European abandonment’.19 Ernest-Antoine Seillie`re, then president
of the European employer federation UNICE (now called BUSINESSEU-
ROPE) warned that, ‘[i]f the Americans become masters of our financial
market, then this is a severe defeat for our European project’.20 Lachmann
found it ‘essential that we continue to build Europe, and the Europe of stock
markets should take priority over the acquisition of Euronext by the
394 Journal of European Public Policy
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NYSE’.21 French conservative Member of Parliament Jacques Myard (Union
pour un Mouvement Populaire, UMP), known for his vocal support for indus-
trial policy at the national and EU levels, saw the NYSE/Euronext merger as
‘further proof of the vassalization of Europe by the United States’.22
The resonance of appeals to economic patriotism at the European level suf-
fered not only from the weakness of a European identity in general, but from
distrust of ‘imperialist’ Germany in particular. This allowed opponents of inter-
vention to neutralize such appeals by presenting the choice between NYSE and
Deutsche Bo¨rse as a choice between the frying pan and the fire. According to
Daniel Bouton, chairman and CEO of Socie´te´ Ge´ne´rale, one of the two invest-
ment banks advising NYSE with Citigroup on the operation, Frankfurt was
trying to ‘strip Paris of its status as the main financial center on the continent,
after having already obtained the seat of the European Central Bank six years
earlier’.23 Theodore had made the same point more subtly, by justifying his
rejection of Deutsche Bo¨rse’s merger offer on the grounds that ‘[t]heir vision
of Europe was focused on Frankfurt . . . whereas we are a 21st century
company. We are represented in all our capital cities.’24 In the same vein,
Oliver Lefebvre, board member of Euronext and president of the Brussels
Stock Exchange, insisted that ‘[t]he proposal by Deutsche Bo¨rse runs counter
to the interests of the Eurozone . . . By favoring such a merger, one would
destroy the only cross-border example that works at present.’25 Opponents of
a Franco-German alliance drew ammunition from an off-hand comment by
Kurt Viermetz, head of Deutsche Bo¨rse’s supervisory board, who had
boasted, in March 2006, that one could ‘turn off the lights in the rest of
Europe’ if Euronext were to move to Frankfurt.26 Tensions associated with pre-
vious French–German attempts to create European champions – including
Sanofi-Aventis, Siemens/Alstom and earlier disappointments which turned
into bitter competition between the Paris Stock Exchange and the Deutsche
Bo¨rse, provided further grounds for scepticism.
Third, and perhaps most interestingly, questionable ‘patriotic credentials’
contributed to weakening the influence of those business leaders who called
for intervention. Understanding the credibility problems afflicting financial
intermediaries requires the following background knowledge about the demu-
tualization process of the Paris Stock Exchange. Historically, most stock
exchanges, including the Paris Bourse, were owned and controlled by their
direct users, the stockbrokers. They were governed through a mutual structure,
with member-owners contributing their time to governance and self-regulation.
Profits were returned to member-owners in the form of lower access fees or
other benefits. In recent years, many exchanges have changed their legal form
and governance structure by separating ownership rights from membership
rights – a process commonly referred to as demutualization. As a first step
toward demutualization, most exchanges converted membership rights into
common stock holdings, thus making members the legal owners of the corpor-
ation. After that, many exchanges went on to list their own securities on the
stock market, thereby extending the possibility of ownership to outside investors
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(Lee 2010). The French stock exchange, by then part of Euronext, went public
in July 2001. At a time where strategic management was all about disinvestment
in peripheral activities and financial consolidation in the wake of the dot-com
bust, French financial intermediaries gradually sold their stakes in Euronext.
They made good money27 in return for ceding control of the exchange to inter-
national institutional investors, such as Fidelity, and activist hedge funds,
including Harris Associates, Atticus and TCI.
Calls for state intervention in the name of economic patriotism by those who
had sold their own means of protecting French interests sparked widespread
resentment. Philippe Marini, rapporteur of the Finance Commission in the
French Senate and a close ally of Jean-Franc¸ois Theodore, advised the historical
shareholders to ‘stop complaining about a situation which they themselves ha[d]
brought about’.28 He observed that ‘[if] large French and European banks had
kept their shares instead of walking away with their capital gains a little prema-
turely, Euronext could very well have pursued its development autonomously
and continued to integrate further European exchanges into its federal struc-
ture’.29 Even Jean Arthuis, president of the Finance Commission in the
French Senate and a strong opponent of the NYSE/Euronext merger, scolded
the banks for having betraying the public interest by realizing their capital
gains. In his view, this was particularly unacceptable because ‘[i]f anyone
should have an understanding of the general interest, it is the banks. After all,
when they are confronted with difficulties that pose a risk for the financial
system, it is the state which comes to their rescue.’30 Henri Lachmann,
author of the above-mentioned position paper by Paris Europlace, pointed
out that ‘[t]he French banks sold their shares and recently had the chance to
regain control by acquiring a large block of shares that had been placed on
the market . . . Anyone who does not seize such an opportunity should not go
around giving lessons on citizenship to others.’31
By contrast, French Euronext managers backing the merger enjoyed strong
credibility because of their success in founding Euronext – which had trans-
formed the quasi-public French, Belgian and Dutch exchanges into a highly
profitable privatized multinational capable of rivalling the London and Frank-
furt stock exchanges. The federally structured Euronext convinced many that
cross-border stock market alliances could help Paris in its competition against
London and Frankfurt – not least because its French CEO, Jean-Franc¸ois
Theodore, was celebrated as a clever strategist in the international business
press. In June 2002, the influential magazine Institutional Investors even gave
him the front page with an explicit tribute, ‘The´odore [sic] Rex’. Theodore’s
credibility with French Treasury officials was further aided by close network
connections to top-tier civil servants. After graduating from the e´lite E´cole natio-
nale d’administration, Theodore had worked at the French Treasury from 1974
to 1989 before becoming chairman and CEO of the Socie´te´ des bourses franc¸aises
and, from 2000, the head of Euronext. Likewise, his Belgian counterpart Olivier
Lefebvre, president of the Brussels Stock Exchange (PhD in economics from the
Universite´ Catholique de Louvain, MBA from Cornell University) had worked
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at the Belgian Finance Ministry until the mid-1990s, where he had contributed
to the drafting and implementation of laws reforming the national financial
sector.
Apart from the discursive hurdles spelled out above, opponents of the merger
faced several additional difficulties. First, intervention conflicted with the neo-
liberal paradigm which had guided financial sector policy-making in France and
Europe since the 1980s. The decision not to intervene in the NYSE/Euronext
merger coherently followed from earlier measures designed to enhance the inter-
national competitiveness of the French financial centre. First steps toward stock
market demutualization were taken as early as 1984 with reforms authorizing
commercial banks to branch out into investment banking (Feiertag 2005;
Lordon 1997). In March 1988, universal banks, insurance companies and inter-
national brokerage houses were allowed to take control of the Paris Stock
Exchange. The Compagnie nationale des agents de change, a hybrid organization
controlled by a powerful guild of state-authorized officers under the direct
supervision of the French Ministry of Finance, was dismantled and replaced
by the corporation of French exchanges (Socie´te´ des Bourses Franc¸aises – SBF).
In June 1999, the SBF absorbed the three other French market operators: the
Socie´te´ du Nouveau Marche´ dedicated to smaller companies; the Marche´ a`
Terme International de France (MATIF) and the Marche´ des Options
Ne´gociables de Paris (MONEP) for futures and options. In September 2000,
the exchanges of Paris, Amsterdam and Brussels merged to form Euronext
(Djelic and Lagneau-Ymonet 2009). When Euronext went public in 2001,
policy-makers did not insist on a hard core (noyau dur) of European share-
holders for Euronext, even though its management, unlike the historical share-
holders, had recommended measures to ensure ownership stability.
Second, the French drive for financial sector competitiveness through liberal-
ization was also in line with policies promoted by the European Commission.
The latter aimed at the marginalization of direct state intervention in the own-
ership structure, governance or strategy of firms; integration of the European
financial sector through competition; and co-ordination of conflicting interests
through marketization (Mu¨gge 2006). Underlying these policies was the convic-
tion that financial market integration was more likely to result from enhanced
competition between stock exchanges than from enhanced co-operation among
fiercely competing stock exchanges. As Jabko (2006), Posner (2009) and
Denord and Schwartz (2010) demonstrate at length, this conviction stemmed
partly from the prior failure of efforts to link the main European financial
markets by encouraging co-operation, and partly from a long-lasting ideological
stance.
Third, party-strategic calculations meant that political leaders had strong
incentives to prevent the NYSE/Euronext merger from turning into a central
campaign issue in the upcoming presidential elections. The presidential candi-
date for the conservative party, Nicolas Sarkozy, sought to differentiate himself
from the incumbent President Chirac and his archrival Prime Minister de Vil-
lepin by promising a ‘rupture’ with the past. His aim was to appear as a fresh
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figure despite coming from the ruling party and having served as Chirac’s min-
ister for five years. To achieve this, Sarkozy deliberately distanced himself – at
least during the campaign – from Gaullist diplomatic and economic policies by
embracing more neo-liberal positions and by displaying admiration for the
United States and the Bush administration. Meanwhile, the Socialists also
lacked incentives to exploit the NYSE/Euronext merger as a campaign issue.
Their party had lost the 2002 election by failing to gain the expected support
from working class voters (Lefebvre and Sawicki 2005). A campaign focus on
the stock exchange was not deemed a promising remedy. Moreover, in the
wake of the failed 2005 referendum on the European constitution, divisions
within the Socialist party over the desirability of further European integration
ran deep, and the promotion of Euronext as a ‘European champion’ was
feared to further alienate left-wing voters.
Fourth, there were some grounds for believing that a merger with NYSE
might be advantageous from the perspective of economic efficiency. Advocates
of the merger promised synergies from adopting a common trading technology.
They also presented stock market consolidation as an inevitable pre-emptive
response to competitive pressures unleashed by the European Unions’s (EU)
Market in Financial Instruments Directive, which was implemented in Novem-
ber 2007 (Hautcoeur et al. 2010). Last but not least, Deutsche Bo¨rse was less
attractive as a partner for Euronext, because its business model featured a silo
structure which integrated the entire value chain (listing, trading, clearing,
settlement and delivery), whereas Euronext mainly focused on trading activities.
As a result of this divergence in business models, the market capitalization of
Deutsche Bo¨rse exceeded the market capitalization of Euronext to an extent
that made a ‘merger of equals’ unlikely.
However, the above aspects do not satisfactorily explain the government’s
reluctance to intervene. The economic efficiency arguments, in particular,
were contested. Merging firms always promise synergies. Opponents of the
merger questioned some of the figures and calculations presented by its advo-
cates. Moreover, economic rationale is not the only driver of economic
policy. There are ample examples of government efforts to rescue failing com-
panies, and discursive appeals to economic patriotism aim precisely to divert
attention away from strictly economic considerations. Given the strength of
the ‘economic patriotism’ discourse at the time, and given the fact that there
were also actors with material and strategic interests to prevent the merger,
the question thus remains why economic patriotism failed to trump efficiency
considerations in the case at hand. By identifying discursive hurdles, we contrib-
ute to explaining why opponents of the merger failed to frame their interests in
ways that could persuade a broader political audience.
5. CONCLUSION
In sum, our contribution maps the public discourse surrounding the NYSE/
Euronext merger to help explain why opponents of the transatlantic merger
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failed in their appeals to ‘economic patriotism’. Discursive strategies designed to
justify discrimination against territorially defined outsiders ran into several
hurdles, including weak patriotic sentiments for the company concerned; a
lack of patriotic alternatives to the proposed merger; and the questionable
patriotic credentials of those demanding intervention.
Whether lower discursive hurdles would have allowed the build-up of suffi-
cient political pressure to provoke stronger government intervention is imposs-
ible to ascertain. The French state is more than a mere arena for pluralist
struggles among competing interests; rather, the decision not to prevent the
NYSE/Euronext merger was consistent with a long-standing policy agenda of
financial liberalization, and there is no counterfactual evidence. Whether
French policy-makers opted to reduce their involvement in the stock exchange
business because they genuinely believed in the regulatory efficiency of market
forces once installed – a view widespread among EU technocrats, especially
within the Internal Market Directorate – or because they failed to fully antici-
pate the consequences, is equally hard to establish. While most of them might
have been fooled by the time-lag between the gradual sale of shares and the
evident loss of French control over the exchange, some others (including the
Finance Minister Thierry Breton, previously the CEO of Thomson and
France Telecom, as well as the corporate lawyer Christine Lagarde, who was Sec-
retary of Foreign Trade at the time of the merger) acted out of conviction. Alain
Madelin, a neo-liberal former French Finance Minister, for example, found it
‘rather obvious that a stock market enterprise be quoted on the stock market’.32
Nevertheless, given the political context, it is plausible that the lack of broad
electoral mobilization afforded policy-makers greater freedom to pursue their
preferred agenda than they would otherwise have had. Even in statist France,
elected politicians are never completely autonomous, and the timing of the
merger – in the aftermath of the failed 2005 referendum on the EU constitution
and in the run-up to the 2007 presidential elections – provided strong incen-
tives for bowing to electoral demands. The discursive hurdles identified above
help explain why opponents of the merger failed to rally the public behind
their calls for intervention.
Our contribution advances recent research on economic patriotism by iden-
tifying variables that help explain when governments choose to discriminate in
favour of territorially defined insiders. To complement previous work on gov-
ernment action, we focus on the demand side – including the discursive dimen-
sion – of territorially based political intervention. By examining calls for
political intervention and the rhetoric employed, we show that ‘noisy politics’
can be as difficult to engineer as the ‘quiet politics’ described by Culpepper
(2011). To raise the salience of a specific policy issue to front-page news
level, it does not suffice to simply tap into a general current of patriotic senti-
ments. Even in political environments as receptive to economic patriotism as
France was in the year of the rumoured foreign takeover threat to Danone,
the instrumentalization of populist sentiments faces limits.
H. Callaghan & P. Lagneau-Ymonet: The phantom of Palais Brongniart 399
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 H
am
bu
rg
] a
t 0
4:4
7 2
5 J
un
e 2
01
3 
By exploring these limits, our case study also draws attention to hitherto
unexplored effects of territorial ambiguities on the viability of economic patri-
otism. Though contested, the assignment of a territoriality to internationally
operating firms is a prerequisite for any political intervention. Demutualized
stock exchanges have an ambiguous status as listed for-profit companies, on
the one hand, and as trading platforms, on the other. As such, they can be por-
trayed either as national champions that are to be promoted wherever they
choose to play, or as an essential part of the playing field that must be kept at
home (or, by those opposing both kinds of political intervention, as ordinary
private businesses that are best left alone). Where they are multinational enter-
prises, further ambiguities arise as to whether the local, the national or the Euro-
pean level is the appropriate territorial reference for appeals to economic
patriotism. We show that, in the case of Euronext, such territorial ambiguities
represented a discursive hurdle for the proponents of intervention.
The consolidation of the stock exchange industry in other parts of the world
suggests that ‘economic patriotism’ is not a French specialty. For instance, in
Australia, a country which is not commonly known for government interven-
tion in corporate affairs, Singapore Exchange’s takeover of the main Australian
stock exchange in the autumn of 2010 sparked a political outcry and was even-
tually blocked by the Foreign Investment Review Board on ‘national interest’
grounds. Similarly, at the time of writing, in early 2011, the acquisition by
the London Stock Exchange of TMX, which operates the Toronto and Mon-
tre´al exchanges, remains subject to Canadian political approval. Regarding
the battle over NYSE-Euronext between Nasdaq, IntercontinentalExchange
(ICE) and Deutsche Bo¨rse, it remains to be seen whether the regional govern-
ment of Land Hessen will permit the relocation of trading activities or whether
it will exercise its considerable legal powers to ensure the preservation of local
employment and of Frankfurt as a financial centre.
Further case studies of the political discourse surrounding other cross-border
mergers in France and elsewhere would allow for a comparative assessment of
the relationship between rhetoric, mobilization and political action across
sectors and countries. Across sectors, the takeover of the partly French-owned
steel giant Arcelor by its Indian-owned rival Mittal in 2006 would make for
an especially interesting comparison, because it shares not just the timing but
also the multinational structure of the target company with the NYSE/Euronext
merger. Across countries, comparison with the failed 2006/2007 bid by Nasdaq
for the London Stock Exchange would help determine whether financial sector
companies, and stock exchanges in particular, inspire stronger ‘patriotic senti-
ments’ in Anglo-Saxon economies, including Australia, than they do in
France. Comparison with Deutsche Bo¨rse, which still enjoys strong legal protec-
tions against the relocation of business units, would contribute to a better
understanding of the interplay between the regional, national and European
levels of public actions taken to amend the industrial outcomes of market com-
petition.
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Despite a likely increase in political tensions, especially after the recent finan-
cial crisis, the phantom of ‘economic patriotism’ that has long haunted the
French financial centre – including the Palais Brongniart – seems unlikely to
reappear any time soon. While the famously strong ties between political and
economic e´lites that underpinned post-war French dirigisme persist, the signifi-
cance of state intervention has profoundly changed since the 1980s. Our case
study shows that, by the mid-2000s, e´lite networks notwithstanding, the
French government’s commitment to financial deregulation had become
strong enough to withstand calls for discrimination in favour of any territorially
defined insider. Whether this commitment will survive the recent financial crisis
and the consolidation manoeuvres which are reshaping the stock exchange
industry in Europe, North America and South-East Asia is a question that
only time can answer.
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NOTES
1 NYSE-Euronext press release, July 15, 2010
2 De´cret n8 2005-1739, December 30, 2005. After strong opposition from the Euro-
pean Commission, the version of the decree that was finally implemented applies
only to defence-related industries and to gambling.
3 Challenges, 20 December 2006.
4 Financial News, 4 July 2006.
5 The Independent, 8 June 2006.
6 Agence France-Press (AFP), 19 June 2006.
7 AFP, 20 December 2006.
8 Question posed to Jean-Pierre Jouyet during a talk at Institut Droıˆt Dauphine
(IDD) in Paris, 21 October 2009.
9 La Chaıˆne Info (LCI), 9 June 2006.
10 Entreprise et Marche´, 5 July 2006.
11 Business Week, 11 June 2001.
12 In January 2007, Jacques Hamon, Bertrand Jacquillat and Christian Saint-Etienne
released a report on Global Stock Exchange Consolidation to the prime minister,
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which portrayed stock exchange consolidation as inevitable and supported the tie-up
between Euronext and NYSE.
13 Reuters, 9 November 2006.
14 Bloomberg News, 11 October 2006.
15 The Wall Street Journal Europe, 6 October 2006.
16 Reuters, 9 November 2006.
17 Les Echos, 18 December 2006.
18 AFP, 20 December 2006.
19 Boursorama, 7 July 2006.
20 Valeurs actuelles, 9 June 2006.
21 Figaro, 6 October 2006.
22 AFP, 19 December 2006. This line of argument was also promoted by Image 7, the
influential French lobbying consultancy hired by Deutsche Bo¨rse. See N. Raulot
(2007).
23 Le Point, 17 January 2007.
24 Bloomberg, 6 July 2006.
25 L’Echo, 27 June 2006.
26 Futures Magazine, 1 September 2006.
27 French intermediaries obtained seven Euronext shares, valued at 24 euros each, for
every share of the previous operator of the Paris Stock Exchange. The deal was
highly attractive because its shares were poorly valued, at historical cost.
28 La Tribune, 13 November 2006.
29 Bloomberg TV: Forum, 4 July 2006.
30 Boursorama, 7 July 2006.
31 Le Figaro, 21 November 2006.
32 Business FM, Good Morning News, 21 November 2006.
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APPENDIX. LIST OF INTERVIEWEES
Interview partners agreed that notes could be taken and that their names be
mentioned, but declined to be recorded. These one- to two-hour interviews
took place either at their home or at their offices.
Jean-Louis Beffa (CEO of Saint-Gobain), March 2009.
Pervenche Bere`s (President of the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee
of the European Parliament), March 2010.
Arnaud de Bresson (General Delegate, Paris Europlace), May 2010.
Bertrand Collomb (CEO of Lafarge), June 2010.
Jacques Hamon (Professor, University Paris-Dauphine), May 2010.
Pierre de Lauzun (Deputy General Director, Fe´de´ration des Banques Fran-
c¸aises), May 2010.
Helmut Mader (Managing Director of Mader Capital Resources GmbH),
November 2009.
Philippe Marini, (Rapporteur of the French Senate Finance Commission),
September 2010.
Ge´rard Pfauwadel (President of Unigestion), February 2009.
Michel Prada (President of the Autorite´ des Marche´s Financiers), October
2009.
Edouard deLencquesaing (Special Advisor, Paris Europlace), February 2009.
Jean-Franc¸ois Theodore (CEO of Euronext), March 2010 and September
2010.
George Ugeux (CEO of Galileo Partners), April 2010.
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